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THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LICENSES IN INSOLVENCY:
LESSONS FROM THE NORTEL CASE
Anthony Duggan and Norman Siebrasse*
INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property-based industries have become an
increasingly vital part of the economy, but firms in these industries are
not immune from economic distress. Prominent Canadian illustrations
include the Nortel proceedings and Blackberry’s recent financial woes.
Nortel filed for protection under Canada’s Companies’ Creditors
Arrangement Act1 (CCAA) in January 2009. At the same time, various
Nortel affiliates commenced parallel proceedings under Chapter 11 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code2 and the Insolvency Act 1986 (U.K.). In Re
Nortel Networks Corp., the Canadian court approved Nortel’s
application to sell its assets in a series of going concern business sales.
The assets included a substantial patent portfolio, and many of the
patents were subject to current licensing agreements. Nortel developed
an elaborate strategy to ensure as far as possible that licensees’ interests
* Hon. Frank H. Iacobucci Chair, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto;
Professor of Law, University of New Brunswick. Research assistance provided by
Sarah Kitai (JD, 2015, University of Toronto). This article is adapted from a report
prepared for Industry Canada, The Treatment of Intellectual Property Rights in Insolvency
(September, 2013). The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do
not necessarily reflect the views of Industry Canada. We are grateful to Joe
Pascquariello, Goodmans, LLP, counsel to the monitor in the Nortel proceedings,
for providing us with background information and court documents relevant to the
issues discussed in this article. This article has also been published in Canada in the
Annual Review of Insolvency Law (2014). We are grateful to Carswell, the publisher of
the Annual Review of Insolvency Law, for permission to republish.
1 Canada’s Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA), R.S.C., 1985,
c. C-36.
2 11 U.S.C. (2014).
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would not be affected by the sale of the patents, but the broader
question raised by the case was whether a transferee of intellectual
property acquires title subject to, or free of, outstanding licenses. If
those licenses are not enforceable against a transferee, the licensee may
find itself in the unenviable position of having to re-license rights
which it had already paid for, after having invested substantial sunk
costs in reliance on those rights. The question can arise whether the
sale takes place in the course of insolvency proceedings (as with
Nortel) or whether it takes place outside the insolvency system (as
Blackberry had been planning).
In principle the answer to this question should be the same in
both contexts; otherwise outcomes may vary arbitrarily depending on
the circumstances of the sale, which in turn may skew the choice
between selling inside or outside the insolvency system. In other
words, the priority rules that apply in insolvency proceedings should
mirror the rules that apply outside insolvency. There are two main
problems in this connection. The first is that in Canada the priority
rules governing competing claims to intellectual property outside
insolvency are remarkably unsettled. The second is that while the
Canadian insolvency laws permit a debtor to sell its assets outside the
ordinary course of business, subject to court approval, they do not
specifically import the priority rules that apply outside insolvency
proceedings to determine the purchaser’s rights relative to those of
third party claimants.
In both respects, the Canadian and United States positions are
very different. By and large, the law outside bankruptcy in the United
States is that a transferee of intellectual property is bound by prior
licenses. This rule is imported into bankruptcy by section 363(f) of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which provides that, in the case of an asset sale,
the purchaser acquires title free and clear of competing interests “if . . .
applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and
clear of such interest.”3 The concern U.S. laws address is that the
licensee may have made substantial investments in reliance on the
license, which would be lost if the license was subordinate to third
party claims. The potential damage to its reliance interest would
increase the upfront risk to prospective licensees, which in turn would
3

11 U.S.C. § 363 (2014).
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have a chilling effect on the licensing of intellectual property. This
policy is also reflected in section 365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
which, in general terms, limits the right of an intellectual property
owner in bankruptcy to reject (disclaim) license agreements.4 There is
a similar restriction in the Canadian insolvency law provisions
governing disclaimer of agreements,5 suggesting that the importance
of protecting the intellectual property licensee’s reliance interest has
been recognized in Canada too. The problem in Canada is that this
policy has not been carried over into the asset sale context.
The purpose of this article is to compare and contrast the
protection given to intellectual property licensees in Canada and the
United States, using the Nortel case as the focus for the discussion. Part
I expands on the underlying policy considerations. The strategy Nortel
developed for addressing licensees’ interests revolved around section
365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. In Part II, we provide a fuller
account of section 365 at large and section 365(n) in particular, and of
the corresponding Canadian provisions. We discuss the Nortel case in
Part III. In Part IV, we turn to the rules governing asset sales in both
countries, making the point that in Canada, as the law currently stands,
while a debtor may be effectively precluded from disclaiming
intellectual property licenses in insolvency proceedings, it might
nevertheless be able to achieve the same result by selling the underlying
intellectual property. This possibility did not surface in the Nortel case
itself, because the sale process in Nortel was largely driven by United
States, not Canadian, law; but it is likely that in some future case the
issue will arise. In Part V, we discuss possible reforms. We conclude
that reform of Canadian law relating to the rights of licensees on
assignment of the licensed rights is urgently required, both outside and
inside of insolvency.
I.

THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Protection against termination of licenses as a result of the
licensor’s financial distress has become a pressing concern with the rise
of “patent assertion entities,” pejoratively referred to as “patent trolls,”
whose business model consists of buying and asserting patents against
4
5

11 U.S.C. § 365 (2014) (discussed infra Part II , Section A).
See, e.g., CCAA, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36; see infra Part II , Section B.
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other firms without exploiting the technology themselves.6 The $612.5
million settlement entered into by Research in Motion in consequence
of its litigation with the patent assertion entity NTP is the best known
example of trolling involving a Canadian firm, but any firm doing
business in the United States is exposed.7 At present, trolls are most
active in the United States, but at least one patent assertion entity is
already active in Canada, and there is concern that trolling will spread
further in Canada and other jurisdictions as the business model
matures.8
There are two broad types of trolling behavior.9 One is
litigation of poor quality patents to obtain litigation cost settlements,
in which the defendant finds it cheaper to settle than to challenge the
validity of the patent in court.10 The more problematic variety involves
opportunistic litigation, which takes advantage of the defendant’s
investment in the technology at issue.11 The well-known NTP v.
Research in Motion, Ltd. litigation is a classic example.12 NTP held broad
patents covering the use of cell phone frequencies for email access.13
While this idea itself was no doubt valuable, there is no question that
the large investment made by RIM (Research in Motion) in
implementing the concept also made a major contribution to the
success of the company; indeed, it is not unlikely that RIM’s
contribution very substantially exceeded the value of the idea itself.
However, RIM did not obtain a license from NTP at the outset,
apparently because it developed the concept independently and it was
not aware of the patent at the time of its investment.14 Independent
creation is not a defense to patent infringement however, and as a
6
See generally Norman Siebrasse, Business Method Patents and Patent Trolls, 54
CAN. BUS. L.J. 38 (2013).
7
See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd, (Fed. Cir. 2005); and see
Coastal Contacts Inc. v. Elastic Path Software Inc. (2013) B.C.S.C. 133 (Can.) for an
example of a smaller Canadian firm caught by a U.S. troll.
8
Dovden Investments Ltd. has filed approximately one third of patent
infringement actions in Canada in 2013. See Alan Macek, Patent Trolls in Canada?,
SLAW (June 21, 2013), www.slaw.ca/2013/06/21/patent-trolls-in-canada/.
9
See generally Norman Siebrasse, supra note 6.
10
Id. at 42.
11
Id.
12
See NTP, 418 F.3d 1282.
13
See id.
14
Id.
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patent is a property right, injunctive relief is normally granted to a
successful patentee.15 After succeeding in its U.S. infringement action
against RIM, NTP was awarded $53.7 million in damages, but armed
with a permanent injunction, it was able to extract a settlement of over
$600 million.16 This illustrates the general problem of opportunism; if
bargaining between the parties takes place after the user of the
patented technology has invested sunk costs in reliance on that
technology, the amount which the owner of the patent can extract is
not merely the value of the technology, but also the value of that
additional investment, which would have to be abandoned if no
settlement can be reached. The higher price that can be extracted
because of sunk costs is known as the “hold-up” value of the patent,
and correspondingly, the problem is commonly known as “patent
hold-up.” To use a simple analogy, if you are going to buy land to build
your retirement home, you want to negotiate the price with the
landowner before you build your house, not afterwards.
The potential for opportunism arises in patent cases because
independent creation is not a defense, and patent rights are often
poorly defined, so it may be difficult for a technology user to know in
advance whether it is infringing any patent rights. The problem of
patent trolls appears to be greatest with respect to software patents and
business methods patents, both of which are said to be particularly
poorly defined.17 More generally, however, the problem of
opportunism arises whenever the user of technology has to bargain
after investing sunk costs in reliance on that technology.18 This is
pervasive in the case of licensees. It is normal for a business user of
almost any technology to invest in its implementation. Even basic
office productivity software requires training staff in its use, and any
more specialized technology requires commensurately more specific
investment. Licensees, by definition, protect themselves against
opportunism by licensing the technology on reasonable terms before
investing in it. But the opportunism will be a threat if the license is
terminated, even though the licensee is living up to its terms and wants
15
This has changed in the United States since the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), which held
that injunctions should no longer be granted routinely to prevailing patentees.
16
NTP, 418 F.3d at 1287, 1325-26.
17
Siebrasse, supra note 6 at 47.
18
Id. at 42-43.
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to continue using the technology. This is exactly the problem that
arises if the license can be terminated on insolvency of the licensor, or
if a licensor can effectively terminate the license simply by assigning
the intellectual property rights to a third party. Opportunism of this
type can arise with respect to trademarks or copyright just as well as
with patents, because it does not depend on features of the intellectual
property peculiar to patents.
The problem is illustrated by the recent Qimonda decision in the
United States.19 A major German semiconductor manufacturer,
Qimonda, became insolvent, and the insolvency administrator sent
letters to the licensees of Qimonda’s patents declaring that their
licenses were unenforceable under the German Insolvency Code.20
The insolvency administrator intended to re-license the patents back
to the existing licensees for the benefit of Qimonda’s creditors.21 That
is, the existing licensees would have had to pay again for licenses that
they already had. Moreover, the licensees were apparently largely other
semiconductor manufacturers who would have had to negotiate the
licenses in the face of very large sunk costs invested in their
semiconductor designs in reliance on the licensed technology, and the
re-negotiated licenses would have been substantially more expensive
than the original licenses.22
The United States litigation arose because the insolvency
administrator appointed by the Munich court sought an order from the
U.S. courts recognizing the German proceeding in order to obtain
administration of Qimonda’s U.S. patents. The U.S. courts ultimately
granted the order, but subject to the condition that licensees of
Qimonda’s U.S. patents be given the same treatment that they would
have received under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which, as described
below, provides substantial protection to existing licensees.

19
Jaffé v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013) (known as
Qimonda after the name of the debtor, for which Jaffé was the insolvency
administrator) [hereinafter Qimoda].
20
Insolvenzordung [InsO] [German Insolvency Code], Oct. 5, 1994,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] 2082.
21
Qimonda, 737 F.3d 14.
22
Id. (The original licenses were largely paid for in-kind with crosslicenses, which is common practice in the semi-conductor industry.).
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Qimonda illustrates the threat to the licensee’s reliance interest, which
may emerge from unilateral termination of licenses as a result of
insolvency. We will see that the recent amendments to the Canadian
insolvency laws provide some protection to licensees from termination
by the insolvency administrator, as in Qimonda, but that protection can
potentially be circumvented by termination of the rights on an
assignment of the technology by the insolvency administration, rather
than disclaimer of the license by the insolvency administrator itself.
This is a major concern because patent trolls often obtain their patents
on the insolvency of a technology company. This means that if
Qimonda were to arise in Canada, the licensees might have to renegotiate their licenses from trolls who had purchased the patent rights
from the insolvency administrator. Moreover, the rights of a licensee
outside of bankruptcy are unclear; remarkably it may well be that
license rights are unenforceable against an assignee. This means that
an intellectual property owner in financial distress might be able to
monetize its rights by assigning them to a troll prior to any insolvency,
and the troll would be able to re-negotiate with the licensee free of the
licenses, which bound the original owner.
II. The Rejection (Disclaimer) of Executory Contracts
A.

The United States’ Position

Section 365 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides for the
rejection, assumption, and assignment of executory contracts in
bankruptcy proceedings.23 All three options require court approval,
and the courts generally apply a business judgment test in determining
whether to grant approval.24 The purpose of the provisions is to
maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the
creditors by allowing the trustee to cherry-pick the debtor’s
uncompleted contracts, rejecting contracts that would be unprofitable
for the estate to perform and assuming contracts where the returns to
the estate from performance are likely to exceed the cost. The
Bankruptcy Code does not define “executory contract,” but the term
is generally accepted to mean “a contract under which the obligation[s]
of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far
11 U.S.C. § 365 (2014).
The provision imposes various other restrictions on assumption and
assignment, which are not presently relevant.
23
24
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unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would
constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other”
(the “Countryman definition”).25 The key feature of the Countryman
definition is that to qualify as an executory contract, an agreement must
remain at least partially unperformed on both sides.
Some intellectual property license agreements may fall outside
the scope of the provision for this reason. The outright sale of a
product coupled with a non-exclusive license to use the intellectual
property embodied in the product is case in point. A particular example
is where the debtor or counter-party distributes “a mass-marketed
computer software product . . . in conjunction with a ‘shrink wrap’ end
user license agreement granting the user nonexclusive rights to use the
software.”26 “The end user makes a one-time payment and receives the
software product. . . . [T]he end user may have ongoing responsibilities
under [the] license based on the restrictions in the license,” but the
licensor’s performance is complete upon delivery of the product.27
Another example is where an “author . . . licenses a completed
copyrighted work to a publisher in exchange for either a lump sum
payment or an ongoing royalty stream.”28 Here the “licensor’s
obligations are complete upon delivery of the work” and, since the
contract is not still at least partially unperformed on both sides, section
365 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code may not apply.29
On the other hand, many intellectual property licenses do fall
within the Countryman definition because there are outstanding
obligations on both sides. For example, in the case of a patent license,
the licensee will typically have “an ongoing obligation to . . . pay
royalties for the life of the agreement” and may have “[o]ther material
ongoing . . . obligations [as well,] such as sharing [the] technology with
the licensor . . . and marking all products sold under the license with
[the appropriate] patent notice.”30 For its part, the licensor will
25
Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 439, 460 (1973).
26
Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An
Economic Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 759 (2007).
27
Id. at 766.
28
Id. at 762
29
Id.
30
Id. at 761.
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commonly have ongoing obligations such as giving a “nonexclusive
licensee notice of any patent infringement suit or any other use or
licensing of the process, refraining from licensing the technology to
anyone else at a lower royalty rate . . ., approving grants of
sublicenses . . ., indemnifying licensees for losses, and defending
claims of infringement.”31
Some courts in the United States have held that the licensor’s
forbearance from suing the licensee for infringement is an ongoing
obligation and that the license agreement is an executory contract on
that basis, regardless of whether the licensor is subject to any other
ongoing obligations.32 However, this view has been disputed on the
ground that by granting the license, the licensor gives up the right to
sue the licensee for infringement and the licensor’s performance is
complete at that point.33 A copyright license will satisfy the
Countryman definition if it relates to a work yet to be created or that
is still to be edited, revised, or otherwise adapted.34 In such cases, the
creative artist is subject to ongoing obligations and so the contract
remains at least partly unperformed on her side, while the publisher’s
obligation to publish the work represents an unperformed obligation
on its side.35 A trademark license will nearly always satisfy the
Countryman definition because the licensor has continuing quality
control obligations and the licensee typically has payment, reporting,
marketing, and other continuing performance obligations.36 Businessto-business software licensing agreements typically involve ongoing
performance obligations on both sides and so satisfy the Countryman
definition, but, as indicated above, business-to-consumer (end user)

Id. at 761-62; see also Peter M. Gilhuly, Kimberly A. Posin & Ted A.
Dillman, Intellectually Bankrupt?: The Comprehensive Guide to Navigating IP Issues in Chapter
11, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 2-10 (2013).
32
See, e.g., Everex Sys. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673
(9th Cir. 1996).
33
Id.; Cf. Madlyn Gleich Primoff & Erica G. Weinberger, E-Commerce and
Dot-Com Bankruptcies: Assumption, Assignment and Rejection of Executory Contracts, Including
Intellectual Property Agreements, and Related Issues Under Sections 365(c), 365(e) and 365(n)
of the Bankruptcy Code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 307, 316.
34
Menell, supra note 26 at 763.
35
Id. at 763; Gilhuly et al., supra note 31, at 8-9.
36
Menell, supra note 26 at 764; Gilhuly et al., supra note 31, at 9-10.
31
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license agreements typically do not involve ongoing performance
obligations on the licensor’s part.37
In Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond Metal Finishers, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a technology license was an
executory contract to which section 365 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
applied, entitling the debtor-licensor’s trustee to reject the agreement,
subject to the court’s approval.38 The Lubrizol case was widely criticized
on both doctrinal and policy grounds and, in 1988, Congress enacted
section 365(n) to reverse the decision.39 Section 365(n) provides that
“[i]f the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the debtor
is the licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee” may
either: (1) treat the contract as terminated if the rejection would
constitute a repudiatory breach outside bankruptcy; or (2) elect to
retain its basic rights under the contract for the duration of the term,
including the right to enforce any exclusivity provision, subject to a
continuing obligation to make royalty payments.40 If the licensee
exercises the second option, it retains its right to the intellectual
property itself, effectively limiting the trustee’s rejection to ancillary
aspects of the agreement (for example, obligations relating to the
provision of training, maintenance, or update facilities).
B.

The Position in Canada

Section 65.11 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA),
which applies in BIA proposal proceedings, and CCAA, section 32,
which applies in CCAA proceedings, provide for the disclaimer or
resiliation (rejection) of agreements.41 The provisions were enacted in

Menell, supra note 26 at 765-66.
See generally Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d
1043 (4th Cir. 1985).
39
Jay Westbrook, The Commission’s Recommendations Concerning the Treatment
of Bankruptcy Contracts (1997) 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 470-72. See also
Sunbeam Prods. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the Lubrizol
reasoning); Jarrod N. Cone, A “Sunbeam” of Hope: The Seventh Circuit’s Solution
Overcoming Disparaging Treatment to Trademark Licensees Under the Bankruptcy Code, 20 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 347 (2013).
40
11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2014).
41
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.
37
38
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2005, amended in 2007, and came into force in 2009.42 The main
features are:


the trustee (monitor) must first approve the proposed
disclaimer;



following this, the debtor must notify the counter-party,
and the counter-party has fifteen days to apply to the
court for disallowance of the disclaimer;



in hearing an application by either the counter-party or the
debtor, the court must consider whether the disclaimer
would enhance the prospects of a viable restructuring43
and whether the disclaimer “would likely cause significant
financial hardship to [the counter-party]”44;



if the contract is disclaimed, the counter-party has a
provable claim in the proceedings for any loss; and



the following contracts cannot be disclaimed: eligible
financial contracts, collective agreements, a financing
agreement where the debtor is the borrower and a lease
of real or personal property where the debtor is the
landlord (lessor).

The provisions refer to “agreements” and, unlike their United
States counterpart, they are not limited to “executory contracts.”45 It is
beyond the scope of the present discussion to explore the implications

42

Statute c. 47, enacted in November 2005; Statute c. 36, enacted in June,

2007.
“[W]ould enhance the prospects of a viable proposal being made in
respect of the debtor”, BIA, R.S.C. 1985,,s. 65.11; “would enhance the prospect of a
viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company”, CCAA,
R.S.C., 1985, s. 32. This wording presupposes restructuring proceedings, as opposed
to liquidation proceedings. But it has been held that the provision should be
interpreted expansively to cover liquidation proceedings as well: Re Timminco Ltd.,
[2012] ONSC 4471 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.), at ¶¶. 51,52.
44
CCAA, R.S.C., 1985, s. 32.
45
See David Ullmann & Melissa McCready, Licensed to Steal: The Rights of
IP Licensors and Licensees in an Insolvency, ANN. REV. INSOLVENCY L. 201, 203 (2010).
43
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of this point;46 for present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the
provisions clearly apply to intellectual property license agreements.
BIA section 65.11(7) and CCAA section 32(6) are loosely
based on section 365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. They provide
that if the debtor has granted to a party to an agreement a right to use
intellectual property, the disclaimer or resiliation does not affect the
party’s right to use the intellectual property during the term of the
agreement, as long as the party continues to perform its obligations
under the agreement in relation to the use of the intellectual property.47
BIA section 65.11 applies in BIA proposal proceedings and
CCAA section 32 applies in CCAA proceedings.48 There is,
inexplicably, no corresponding provision for disclaimer in bankruptcy
proceedings. However, the courts have held that there is a common
law power of disclaimer.49 The common law power of disclaimer
derives from the trustee’s freedom not to perform the contract. Nonperformance is a breach of contract which entitles the counter-party
to the normal contract remedies. However, unless the counter-party
has a right of specific performance or a similar right, the counter-party
cannot compel the trustee to perform the contract and it will be limited
to a damages claim for which it will have to prove in the debtor’s
bankruptcy.50 In Re Thomson Knitting Co., the court held that the trustee
must elect to affirm or disclaim within a reasonable time and, failing
an election, the counter-party is entitled to assume that the trustee has
disclaimed the contract.51 BIA, section 121(1) defines “provable claim”
to mean “debts and liabilities . . . to which the bankrupt is subject” on
the date of the bankruptcy or “to which the bankrupt may become
subject during” the bankruptcy by reason of an obligation incurred
For discussion, see Anthony Duggan & Norman Siebrasse, The
Disclaimer, Affirmation and Assignment of Intellectual Property Licences in Insolvency, J.
INSOLVENCY INST. CAN. 163, 166-69.
47
BIA, R.S.C. 1985, s. 65.11(7); CCAA, R.S.C., 1985 s. 32(6).
48
BIA, R.S.C. 1985, s. 65.11(7); CCAA, R.S.C., 1985 s. 32(6).
49
Re Thomson Knitting Co. (1924), 5 C.B.R. 189 (Can. Ont. S.C. in
Bankruptcy)(aff’d (1925) 5 C.B.R 489 (Can. Ont. S.C. in Bankruptcy App. Div.));
New Skeena Forest Products v. Don Hull Sons Contracting (2005), 251 D.L.R 4th
328 (Can. B.C. C.A.); In the Matter of the Bankruptcy of North American Steamships
Ltd. 2007 B.C.S.C. 267.
50
Id.
51
See generally Re Thomson Knitting Co. (1924), 5 C.B.R. 189.
46
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before the date of the bankruptcy.52 In other words, generally speaking,
only pre-filing claims are provable claims. However, the counterparty’s claim, which arises when the trustee disclaims a contract, is a
provable claim even though it arises post-filing. This is an exception to
the general rule.53
It is unsettled whether the common law right of disclaimer
extends to intellectual property licenses. In Re Erin Features No. 1 Ltd.,
the court denied the right of a trustee in bankruptcy to disclaim a
license agreement giving the licensee exclusive rights to market a film
in Canada.54 The decision was based on the proposition that the right
of disclaimer cannot be used to disturb established property rights. On
the other hand, in Re T. Eaton Co., the court allowed the debtor in
CCAA proceedings to disclaim an agreement giving a credit card
company an exclusive license to supply credit card services to the
debtor’s customers.55 The court decided the case mainly on the basis
that restricting the debtor’s right to disclaim unprofitable contracts

BIA, R.S.C. 1985, s. 121(1).
The exception is provided for in BIA, R.S.C. 1985, s. 121(1), which
provides as follows:
52
53

“All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt
is subject on the da[te] on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt
or to which the bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt’s discharge
by reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt
becomes bankrupt shall be deemed to be claims provable in
proceedings under this Act.” (Emphasis added).
Duncan explains the meaning of the italicized words as follows:
“The class of claims covered by [these words] include[s] cases of
contract where the trustee either disclaims or ceases to perform
the contract. In such case[s] the creditor may prove against the
estate for the damages occasioned by the breach of the contract,
and this is his only remedy.”
See Roderick J. Wood & David J. Bryan, Creeping Statutory Obsolescence in Bankruptcy
Law, 3 J. INSOLVENCY INST. CAN. 1, 14-15 (2014) (citing LEWIS DUNCAN, THE LAW
AND PRACTICE OF BANKRUPTCY IN CANADA 428-29 (Carswell ed., 1922).
54
See generally Re Erin Features No. 1, Ltd. (1991), 8 C.B.R 3d 205 (Can.
B.C. S.C.).
55
Re T. Eaton Co., (1999) 14 C.B.R. 4th 288 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.).
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would threaten the viability of restructuring arrangements.56 But the
court also held, relying on English authority and contrary to Erin
Features, that a license does not confer property rights on the licensee.
Therefore, there is no reason for treating the disclaimer of licenses any
differently from contracts at large.57
It may be a mistake to think of the issue in terms of property
rights. Disclaimer of a contract in insolvency proceedings amounts to
a breach of the contract, not rescission. The essence of a license
agreement is that the licensor promises not to sue the licensee for
infringement provided the licensee observes the terms of the license.
Outside bankruptcy, if the licensor sued the licensee for infringement
even though the licensee was in compliance with all its obligations
under the license agreement, the licensor would be in breach of its
primary obligation under the license agreement and the court would
disallow the action. In principle, the position should be the same in
bankruptcy, given that the rights of the trustee or debtor in bankruptcy
are no larger than the debtor’s rights outside bankruptcy. In other
words, disclaimer of a license should not prevent the licensee from
using the intellectual property: if the trustee or debtor sues the licensee
for infringement, the court should disallow the action, just as it would
have done if the action had been brought outside bankruptcy.
CCAA section 32 had been enacted but had not been brought
into force at the time of the Nortel proceedings. It follows that at the
time of the proceedings the right of a debtor to disclaim agreements in
CCAA proceedings was governed by the common law as outlined
above and at common law it was unclear whether a licensor could
disclaim a license agreement.
III THE NORTEL CASE
In Re Nortel Networks Corp.,58 the court approved Nortel’s
application to sell its assets, which included a substantial patent
portfolio, in a series of going concern business sales. The proposed
See generally id.
See Heap v. Hartley (1889), 42 Ch.D. 461 (C.A.).
58
Re Nortel Networks Corp (2009), 56 C.B.R. 5th 224 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.
[Commercial List]).
56
57
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patent sales were complicated by the fact that Nortel had entered into
numerous license agreements respecting the patents and it did not have
records for all of them. In other words, some of the patents were
subject to licenses Nortel could not identify. To avoid potential
disputes, which would have detracted from the value generated by the
sales, Nortel decided that the patents would be sold subject to certain
classes of licenses, including “known licenses” and “commercial
licenses.” Known licenses were licenses of which Nortel was aware;
commercial licenses were licenses Nortel had granted in the ordinary
course of its business, including end-user licenses, whether or not they
were specifically known to Nortel or the purchasers.
To deal with licensees whose rights would not be preserved by
the terms of sale (the “unknown licensees”), Nortel devised a strategy
based on section 365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. As indicated
above, section 365(n) provides that if the trustee rejects an executory
contract, under which the debtor is an intellectual property licensor,
the licensee has a choice either to: (1) treat the contract as terminated;
or (2) elect to retain its basic rights under the contract for the duration
of the term. The Nortel strategy gave unknown licensees this choice.
Notices of the proposed sales were widely published, in newspaper
advertisements and elsewhere, inviting unknown licensees to identify
themselves and establish their claims by a specified date. The interests
of licensees who responded in time would continue following the
patent sales and all such licenses would be enforceable against the
patent transferee. In effect, unknown licensees who came forward by
the specified date would transform themselves into known licensees.
On the other hand, unknown licensees who failed to identify
themselves by the claims bar date would be deemed to have elected,
under section 365(n), to have their contracts terminated.
It should be noted that there was no particular class of
unknown licensees that were suspected to exist but could not be
tracked down, and it may well be that there were no unknown licensees
at all. The problem was that Nortel’s records were not sufficiently
complete to confirm this. In summary, the sale was to be subject to all
known licenses and also unknown licenses that were commercial
licenses, but the purchaser would take the patents free and clear of
unknown licenses other than commercial licenses. The objective was
to maximize the sale price while protecting the reliance interests of
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essentially all licensees. The patent sale procedure was approved at a
joint hearing of the Canadian and United States courts in the CCAA
and Chapter 11 proceedings, and the sale took place in late June 2011.59
The patents were bought by a consortium of technology companies
for “a record price of $4.5 billion.”60
Given the cross-border nature of the proceedings, Nortel’s
patent sale process needed to satisfy the requirements of both United
States and Canadian law. As indicated above, Canadian law at the time
of the case was unsettled. The Nortel patent sale process was designed
to ensure compliance with the United States requirements—
specifically, section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code—on the
assumption that these were more stringent than Canadian law, so that
if the sale process complied with the United States requirements it
would also necessarily comply with Canadian law.61 The picture may
have changed with the subsequent coming into force of CCAA, section
32. Section 32 is similar to section 365 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
with section 32(6) being loosely based on section 365(n). However,
there are some potentially significant differences. First, CCAA section
32 clearly requires the debtor to identify the specific agreement it wants
to disclaim, whereas section 365 is more open to interpretation on this
point. The difference matters in cases like Nortel, because if the
debtor’s objective is to disclaim licenses it is unaware of, it will not be
in a position to provide details of individual agreements.62 Second, in
contrast to section 365(n), section 32(6) does not give the counterparty licensee a choice when the license is disclaimed between treating
the agreement as terminated and retaining its rights under the
59
Following the joint hearing, the U.S. court and Canadian court made
separate orders: see In re Nortel Networks, Inc., No. 09–10138 (KG), 2011 WL
4831218(Bankr. D. Del. July 11, 2011); Re Nortel Networks Corporation (Certain
Patents and Other Assets Bidding Procedures Order) (unreported, Can. Ont. Ct.
Justice, 2 May 2011).
60
Joseph Pasquariello and Chris Armstrong, The Nortel Stalking Horse
Sales: Maximising Value Via CCAA Flexibility, 1 J. INSOLVENCY INST. CAN. 123, 137
(2012). The consortium comprised Apple, Ericsson, Microsoft, Research in Motion,
EMC Corporation, and Sony.
61
Id. at 135.
62
But see id. at 136 (arguing that a court might be prepared to accept less
specific characteristics, such as a description of the general nature or type of
agreement, so long as the details were sufficient to enable counter-parties to identify
the agreements the debtor is proposing to disclaim).
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agreement to use the intellectual property for the duration of the term.
Section 32(6) simply provides that disclaimer does not affect the
licensee’s right to use the intellectual property for the duration of the
term.63
In the Nortel case, the debtor relied on the rejection (disclaimer)
rules to avoid the unknown licenses. What might the result have been
if it had relied on the asset sale provisions instead? Section 363 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to sell its assets free and clear
of third party interests, but only if “applicable nonbankruptcy law
permits sale of such property free and clear of such interest.”64 As a
matter of U.S. patent law, the transferee of a patent acquires title
subject to any prior license, whether or not it knew of the license.65
Therefore, if Nortel had proceeded under section 363, it could not
have sold the patents free and clear of the unknown licenses. In the
Nortel case, given the cross-border nature of the proceedings, the sale
process had to comply with the requirements of both U.S. and
Canadian law. But, assume that Canadian law alone had been in play
and Nortel had sold the patents pursuant to CCAA, section 36. Would
the sale have extinguished the licenses? It is to this question that we
now turn.
IV. ASSET SALES
Assume an intellectual property owner, A, assigns the
intellectual property to B and subsequently assigns the same
intellectual property a second time to C. Which assignment prevails?
Or suppose A grants B a license to use the intellectual property and
subsequently assigns the intellectual property to C. Can B enforce the
license against C? Parallel questions can arise in insolvency
proceedings. For example, assume A assigns its intellectual property to
63
But see id. at 155-56, note 22 (arguing that the counter-party should be
free to waive its rights under section 32(6), even though the provision does not
expressly allow for this).
64
11 U.S.C. § 363(f).
65
See Keystone Type Foundry v. Fastpress Co., 272 F. 242, 244-45(2d
Cir. 1921) (“it ha[s] long passed into the text-books that . . . an assignee acquired title
subject to prior licenses of which the assignee must inform himself as best he can,
and at his own risk”). See also, e.g., Armstrong Pump, Inc. v. Hartmann, 745 F. Supp.
2d 227, 233 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
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B and later files for CCAA protection; A wants to transfer the
intellectual property to C, perhaps as part of a going concern sale of
A’s business. Can A sell the intellectual property to C free and clear of
B’s interest? Likewise, suppose A licenses the intellectual property to
B and subsequently files for CCAA protection; can A sell the
intellectual property to C free and clear of B’s license?
In principle, priorities in insolvency proceedings should be the
same as the priorities outside insolvency proceedings. In other words,
as a general rule, the insolvency laws should not change the priority
order that applies outside insolvency proceedings, because otherwise
parties will have an incentive to use the insolvency laws
opportunistically as a means of improving their priority position.66 It is
therefore necessary to understand the priority rules governing
competing intellectual property interests outside insolvency
proceedings to establish the contours of the priority regime inside
insolvency proceedings. Unfortunately, in Canada the law outside
insolvency proceedings is remarkably uncertain. The intellectual
property statutes each provide for registration of assignments or
transfers, but the priority consequences are not clear. We will consider
first priority as between assignees and then priorities in respect of
licenses.
A.

Priorities Outside Insolvency Proceedings

1. Competing intellectual property assignments. – The Trade-marks
Act provides that a mark is transferable and the transfer may be
registered, but it is entirely silent as to the priority consequences, which
therefore presumably would be determined by provincial law.67 In
common law provinces, the rule of nemo dat quod non habet would apply,

66
See Thomas H. Jackson, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW chs. 1-2 (1986).
67
Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, s. 48. The same is true of the
Industrial Design Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-9, s. 13, and the Integrated Circuit
Topography Act, S.C. 1990, c. 37, s. 21. “Where the ownership of a trade-mark is
transferred, failure to register the change of ownership could lead to the loss of the
distinctiveness of the mark. Thus a delay in the registration of an assignment does
not negate the transfer, but failure to register in due course may threaten the validity
of the mark.” TERESA SCASSA, CANADIAN TRADEMARK LAW 123 (2010.
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and a first assignee of legal title, or any property interest, would prevail
over all subsequent interests, regardless of registration.68
The Copyright Act does have a priority provision. Section
57(3) of the Act provides:
Any assignment of copyright, or any licence granting
an interest in a copyright, shall be adjudged void
against any subsequent assignee or licensee for valuable
consideration without actual notice, unless the prior
assignment or licence is registered in the manner
prescribed by this Act before the registering of the
instrument under which the subsequent assignee or
licensee claims.69
On its face this provision might seem to provide for a first-toregister priority scheme. However, in Poolman v. Eiffel Productions,70
Pinard J. in the Federal Court construed the provision very narrowly.
The plaintiff claimed to have obtained an assignment of copyright
from the author in 1964.71 The defendant obtained an assignment of
the copyright from the author in 1989.72 The defendant had no
knowledge of the purported prior assignment to the plaintiff.73 In
1991, the plaintiff presented for registration at the Copyright Office
the assignment that had been executed in 1964.74 The plaintiff claimed
priority on the basis either of prior assignment or prior registration. 75
Pinard J. held for the defendant.76 There are two points of interest.
First, Pinard J. held that section 57(3) does not establish a first-toregister priority regime. Indeed, it does not establish any priority
regime at all: “the registering of the instrument under which an interest
in a copyright is granted is not compulsory and, except as expressly
Roderick J. Wood, Security Interests in Intellectual Property: Rationalizing the
Registries, in SECURITY INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 699, 671 (Howard
Knopf, ed., 2002).
69
Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42 s. 57 (2014).
70
Poolman v. Eiffel Productions (1991), 35 C.P.R. 3d ¶384 (Can. Fed. Ct.).
71
Id. ¶ 2.
72
Id. ¶ 6.
73
Id. ¶ 16.
74
Id. ¶ 2
75
Id. ¶ 4
76
Id.
68
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provided . . . in s.57(3) above, creates nothing more than a
presumption of ownership of such interest that can be rebutted.”77
Second, Pinard J. held that ownership was to be determined as a matter
of provincial law, which in this case was the law of Quebec, where all
the transactions had taken place.78 On the facts, and relying on the
Quebec Civil Code, Pinard J. held that, even if the plaintiff had in fact
taken an assignment of the copyright from the author in 1964, the
defendant’s later assignment prevailed as being a “commercial sale”
without notice of the prior assignment.79 The defendant was therefore
the owner of the copyright.80
As Professor Vaver has remarked, Poolman effectively
“subordinated the whole federal scheme” to provincial law.81 Poolman
implies that in a common law province, therefore, the rule of nemo dat
quod non habet would apply, as discussed above, and a first assignee
would prevail whether or not it was the first to register.82 Indeed, even
a first assignee who failed to register at all would prevail, so long as
they could prove the assignment, since registration “creates nothing
more than a presumption of ownership.”83
Vaver describes Poolman as “doubtful” on the basis that “[t]he
Copyright Act provides its own national registration and priority scheme
for copyrights. Little room seems left for the different provincial

Id. ¶ 24.
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. ¶ 27
81
DAVID VAVER, COPYRIGHT LAW 248 (2000).
82
Wood, supra note 68.
83
It is not clear what independent effect Pinard J. would give to s. 57(3).
He stated that “This provision of the Copyright Act states only that a prior
assignment of an interest in a copyright must be adjudged void as against any
subsequent assignee unless such prior assignment is duly registered before the
registering of the instrument under which the subsequent assignee claims.” But, it is
not clear what this means if it does not apply on the facts of Poolman itself. But cf.
Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., [2002] (2001) 1 F.C. 495, ¶ 100 (Can. Fed.
Ct.) (where Rothstein J., in obiter, read s.51 of the Patent Act as establishing a first to
register priority rule. Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, s. 51 is in similar terms to
Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, s. 57(3) (2014)).
77
78
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schemes to operate.”84 In his view, under the priority scheme
established by section 57(3), registrable interests
usually take priority in order of registration. If the
grants are unregistered, the later grant has priority if
taken for valuable consideration without actual notice
of the prior grant. Otherwise unregistered grants are
subordinated to later registered grants, except perhaps
where reliance on the registration is fraudulent.85
Vaver’s interpretation is a straightforward reading of the
provision, and to date Poolman has not been judicially re-considered. It
is entirely possible that a different court would view the Copyright Act
as enacting a complete code, as Vaver suggests.
The priority provision in the Patent Act is section 51:
Every assignment affecting a patent for invention,
whether it is one referred to in section 49 or 50, is void
against any subsequent assignee, unless the assignment
is registered as prescribed by those sections, before the
registration of the instrument under which the
subsequent assignee claims.86
This is in slightly different terms than section 57(3) of the
Copyright Act, but it is sufficiently similar that the same problem will
arise as to whether it constitutes a complete code.87 One difference
between the two provisions is that section 57(3) specifically
subordinates interests taken with actual notice of a prior interest, while
section 51 of the Patent Act does not. Nonetheless, it has been held in
the patent context that a party taking with actual notice of a prior
VAVER, supra note 81, at 248.
Id. at 248-49
86
Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 51.
87 The registration provision of the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act, S.C. 1990,
c. 20, s. 31(3), is also in similar terms. The Patent Act priority provisions have
recently been amended. . In particular, t s. 51 has been renumbered s. 49(4), and it
has been redrafted to read as follows: “A transfer of a patent that has not been
recorded is void against a subsequent transferee if the transfer to the subsequent
transferee has been recorded.” The new wording does not appear to affect the
substance of the provision.
84
85
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interest will be subordinated, so this difference on the face of the Acts
does not amount to a difference in the law.88
2. Priorities relating to licenses. - Given the uncertainty regarding
priority between assignees, it should not be surprising that the priority
of licensees is also uncertain. The traditional view is that a license is
non-proprietary in nature and that it gives the licensee a mere
contractual right against the licensor. Consequently, at common law
the nemo dat rule of priorities would not apply to give a licensee priority
against a subsequent transferee of the intellectual property. On the
contrary, the position is that, since equity will not order specific
enforcement of the license against a party who was not in privity, a
subsequent transferee of the intellectual property will have priority
over a prior licensee, even if the subsequent transferee had actual
knowledge of the license.89
Intellectual property licenses have traditionally been
assimilated to licenses generally, as not giving a proprietary interest.90
The Supreme Court of Canada has said that, under the Copyright Act,
an exclusive licensee has “a limited property interest in the
copyright,”91 at least to the extent that an exclusive licensee can sue in
its own name, though at the same time the Court confirmed that the
interest of a non-exclusive intellectual property licensee is entirely nonproprietary.92 The Patent Act is even broader; it gives any subordinate
interest holder the right to sue in its own name, though the patent
owner must be joined.93 Similarly, under the Trade-marks Act, any
licensee can sue in its own name if the owner fails to institute an action
at the licensee’s request.94 In Heap v. Hartley, the leading case for the
general proposition that an intellectual property license is not
proprietary in nature, the question at issue was whether an exclusive

Colpitts v. Sherwood (1927), 3 D.L.R. 7 (Can. C.A.).
King v. Allen (1916), 2 A.C. 54 (H.L.); see Richard E. Gold, Partial
Copyright Assignments: Safeguarding Software Licensees Against the Bankruptcy of Licensors, 33
CAN. BUS. L.J. 193, 206-07 (2000).
90
Heap v. Hartley (1889), 42 Ch.D. 461 (C.A.); Euro-Excellence Inc. v.
Kraft Canada Inc., [2007], 3 S.C.R. 20, 28 (Can.).
91
Euro-Excellence, 3 S.C.R. 2 at 22.
92
Id. at 28.
93
Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 55.
94
Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 50(3).
88
89
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licensee could sue in its own name.95 The specific holding in Heap v.
Hartley, that it cannot, has therefore been legislatively reversed.96
However, the ability to sue in one’s own name is only one indication
of a proprietary interest, and it is doubtful that this characteristic would
make an exclusive license proprietary for priority purposes as well.97 In
other words, the fact that an exclusive license is proprietary for the
purposes of bringing suit probably does not suffice to make it
proprietary for priority purposes.
The question, therefore, is the extent to which the statutory
priority provisions operate to affect the priority of licensees. As the
Trade-marks Act has no priority provisions, the priorities of licenses
will depend on provincial law.98 If Poolman is good law, the same is true
with respect to patent and copyright licenses, notwithstanding any
registration.
If, on the other hand, the statutory provisions of the Copyright
Act and the Patent Act do provide a complete code, the priority of
licenses will turn on the interpretation of those provisions. Under the
Copyright Act, any “licence granting an interest in [a] copyright” is
registrable99 and treated in exactly the same manner as an assignment
for priority purposes under section 57(3). It is clear that an interest in
a copyright includes an exclusive license, and Professor Vaver has
Heap, 42 Ch.D. at 464-65.
See generally id.
97
The Supreme Court in Euro-Excellence, referred to the property interest
as “limited” and it cited statutory provisions, inferring that these granted the
exclusive licensee the right to sue in its own name; so it may be that the reference to
a “limited proprietary interest” was no more than a label for a conclusion regarding
the interpretation of the Act on this point, with no wider implications. The Court
also stated that the property interest of the exclusive licensee “does not include an
interest that defeats the ownership interest of the licensor.” Euro-Excellence, 3 S.C.R.
¶ 34. This implies, without stating directly, that it could not defeat the ownership
interest of a party claiming under the licensor.
98
The Canadian Intellectual Property Office now allows registration of
security interests under that provision; James G. Fogo, Assignment and Licensing of
Trade-marks, in TRADE-MARKS LAW OF CANADA 165, 175 (Gordon F. Henderson,
ed., 1993). (The registration provisions of the Trade-marks Act provide for the
registration of the “transfer” of any registered mark. At one time “transfer” was
interpreted by the Canadian Intellectual Property Office to mean only the outright
assignment in full of all rights.).
99
Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, s. 53(2.2) (2014).
95
96
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argued that it also includes an irrevocable non-exclusive license,
especially if the licensee has invested in reliance on the license.100 If that
is so, then irrevocable non-exclusive licenses are both registrable and
subject to the same priority rules as assignments.
The Patent Act priority provision is not entirely clear.
Exclusive licenses are clearly registrable: section 50(2) provides that
every “assignment of a patent, and every grant. . . of any exclusive
right . . . shall be registered.”101 However, the priority provision,
section 51, refers only to “every assignment,” and makes no mention
of exclusive licenses. On the one hand, it would seem logical that if it
is possible to register an exclusive license in the same manner as an
assignment, the priority consequences of registration should be the
same; on the other hand, the failure to mention exclusive licenses in
the priority provision, when they are expressly mentioned in the
registration provision, suggests a legislative intent to treat them
differently.102
Non-exclusive licenses are clearly not registrable at all under
the Patent Act. Non-exclusive licenses may also not be registrable
under the Copyright Act, as Professor Vaver’s interpretation has never
been judicially tested. It is not clear which priority rules apply to
unregistrable non-exclusive licenses. If, as Vaver argues, the federal
statutes provide a complete code, then federal law and not provincial
law should determine the priority of unregistrable interests. But there
is no case law as to what such a priority scheme might be. Alternatively,

David Vaver, The Exclusive Licence in Copyright, 9 INTELLECTUAL PROP.
J. 163, 189 (1995).
101
Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 50(2).
102
As indicated in note 87, supra, the Patent Act priority provisions have
recently been amended.. Section 50(2) has been renumbered s.49(3), and it has been
reworded to read as follows: “The Commissioner shall, subject to the regulations,
record the transfer of a patent on the request of the patentee or . . . of a transferee
of the patent.” The proposed new provision omits the reference to “any exclusive
right.” Consequently, an exclusive license may no longer be registrable, unless the
courts read the reference to a “transfer” as including an exclusive license.
100
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provincial law might apply to fill the gaps in the federal priority
scheme.103
Even if they are registrable, it is generally not practical to
register non-exclusive licenses, such as end-user licenses. The result is
that a subsequent assignee will probably take clear of non-exclusive
licenses. If non-exclusive licenses are not registrable at all, and
provincial law applies, then under the common law at least the assignee
will take clear, even if it has knowledge of the prior licenses. If they are
registrable, but unregistered, then the assignee will take clear unless it
has knowledge, as a matter of the statutory priority rules.
As a matter of policy, the basic assimilation of intellectual
property licenses to licenses of real or personal property is
questionable. An exclusive license of intellectual property is
functionally very similar to an assignment, as the licensee’s rights are
normally exclusive even of the rights of the owner. On the other hand,
a non-exclusive license relating to intellectual property is different
from a license relating to tangible property. A license relating to
tangible property will affect the licensor’s ability to make use of the
property itself; a license granted to allow the licensee to post
advertisements on the wall of a building will prevent the licensor from
doing the same. However, this is not true of intellectual property. A
non-exclusive license does not prevent the licensor from making use
of the intellectual property in any way; it simply prevents the licensor
from suing the licensee for infringement. In this respect, giving
recognition to the license-holder’s rights against a third party assignee
does not prejudice the assignee. On the other hand, failing to uphold
the license in these circumstances may significantly prejudice the
licensee who may have made substantial investments in reliance on the
license. Even a non-exclusive licensee may rely heavily on a license, as
where a large corporation trains its employees in the use of a suite of
office productivity software. The vulnerability of non-exclusive
licensees to having their interests defeated by an assignment outside of
bankruptcy is therefore problematic as a matter of policy. The
unsatisfactory state of the current non-bankruptcy laws in this respect

This is implied by Poolman v. Eiffel Productions (1991), 35 C.P.R. 3d ¶384
(Can. Fed. Ct.), though the point in that case was that the Copyright Act does not
provide a priority system at all.
103
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creates a challenge for insolvency law reform: to what extent is it
possible or desirable to protect the intellectual property licensee’s
reliance interest inside bankruptcy without simultaneously undertaking
a wholesale reform of the applicable non-bankruptcy rules? We pursue
this question below.
B.

Priorities Inside Insolvency Proceedings

1. Assignments. - Assume an intellectual property owner, A,
assigns its intellectual property to B and later applies for CCAA
protection. As part of the CCAA proceedings, A wants to sell its
intellectual property to C, perhaps as part of a going concern sale of
A’s business. Can A sell the intellectual property to C free and clear of
B’s interest? The starting point is CCAA, section 36, which deals with
the sale of assets in CCAA proceedings. CCAA, section 36(1) provides
that the debtor may not sell assets outside the ordinary course of
business without court approval.104 Section 36(3) provides that in
hearing the case, the court must take account of various factors,
including the effects of the proposed sale on creditors and other
interested parties.105 Section 36(6) provides:
The court may authorize a sale . . . free and clear of any
security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it shall also order
that other assets of the company or the proceeds of the sale . . . be
subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the
creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by
the order.106
The provision appears to have been drafted with security
interests and the like specifically in mind, and it does not seem to
contemplate other third party interests such as the prior assignee of an
intellectual property right. However, section 36 would presumably be
read subject to the relevant non-bankruptcy law outlined above.107 On
this basis, a purchaser of intellectual property in a CCAA, section 36
CCAA, R.S.C., 1985, s. 36(1).
Id. s. 36(3).
106
Id. s. 36(6).
107
CCAA, R.S.C., 1985, s. 36 is similar to U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 363; § 363(f) provides specifically for a free and clear sale if “applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such interest.”
104
105
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sale would acquire title subject to any interest which would have
priority under applicable non-bankruptcy law. BIA, section 65.13,
which applies to BIA proposals, is in similar terms to CCAA, section
36, and so the same analysis applies. There are no corresponding
provisions governing the sale of assets in bankruptcy proceedings or
receiverships but, in principle, the capacity of a trustee in bankruptcy
or a receiver to sell intellectual property free and clear of a prior
assignee’s claim should be determined by reference to non-bankruptcy
law, as described above.
2. Licenses. - Now assume that A grants B a license to use its
intellectual property and A subsequently applies for CCAA protection.
Can A, as part of the CCAA proceedings, sell the intellectual property
to C free and clear of B’s license? Again, the starting point is the
proposition that a purchaser of intellectual property in a CCAA,
section 36 sale takes subject to any competing claim that would have
priority outside insolvency proceedings. As indicated above, the
applicable law outside insolvency proceedings is unsettled. The answer
depends on whether the license is registrable so that one or other of
the statutory priority rules applies. If not, then applying provincial law,
C, who is not party to the license agreement between A and B, is not
bound even if C was aware of the license at the date of the transfer.108
This appears to be the result for trademark licenses and non-exclusive
patent licenses, which are not registrable. A different result may follow
if the license is registrable and registered, as in the case of an exclusive
patent or copyright license. But, as discussed above, there is
considerable uncertainty as to application of the Patent Act priority
provision and the scope and application of the Copyright Act
registration and priority provisions.
As noted above, U.S. law is significantly different in this
respect. In the United States, as a general rule, outside bankruptcy an
intellectual property transferee is bound by prior licenses.109 This rule
is imported into bankruptcy law by section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which provides that the trustee may sell assets free and clear of
an interest subject to certain restrictions, including a requirement that

See generally Royal Bank of Canada v. Body Blue, Inc. (2008), 42 C.B.R.
5th 125 (Can. Ont. SCJ).
109
See Keystone Type Foundry v. Fastpress Co., 272 F. 242 (2d Cir. 1921).
108
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“applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and
clear of such interest.”110 One problem with the current Canadian
position is that, if the transferee of intellectual property takes free and
clear of outstanding licenses, a licensor debtor in CCAA proceedings
can do an end run around the restriction in CCAA, section 32(6) on
disclaimer of intellectual property licenses: instead of directly
disclaiming the license, the debtor can avoid it indirectly by assigning
the underlying intellectual property to a third party purchaser. The
result may be to seriously compromise the licensee’s reliance interest,
which was the very concern CCAA, section 32(6) was enacted to
address.111
C.

Nortel Revisited

As discussed earlier, the terms of Nortel’s patent sale were that
buyers would take the patents subject to known licenses and
commercial licenses, but free of unknown licenses. The debtor also
developed a procedure aimed at giving unknown licensees an
opportunity to assert their rights under section 365(n) of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. Licensees who responded before the specified date
became admitted to the “known licenses” fold, which meant that,
under the terms of the proposed sale, their rights were enforceable
against the purchaser. On the other hand, licensees who failed to
respond in time, or at all, were deemed to have elected under section
365(n) to treat their license agreements as terminated. Consequently,
the purchaser acquired title to the patents free and clear of licenses in
this category.
In Nortel, the sale process had to comply with the requirements
of both Canadian and U.S. law and, given section 363(f) of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code read in conjunction with U.S. patent law, Nortel
would not have been able to sell the patents free and clear of the
unknown licenses. This explains why it was forced to take the more
round-about route of relying on section 365(n) instead. But if only
Canadian law had applied, Nortel could have proceeded under CCAA
section 36 (the asset sale provision), in which case the court would
probably have applied the priority rules discussed above to determine
11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1).
The same point applies with respect to BIA, R.S.C. 1985, s. 65.11(7)
in relation to BIA proposal proceedings.
110
111
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the rights of the unknown licensees. It is instructive to compare the
result in Nortel with the result that would have followed if the Canadian
priority rules had applied.
In short, the Nortel plan put the licensees in a substantially
better position than they would have been in otherwise. First, under
the plan the sale was subject to all known and unknown commercial
licenses, including end-user license agreements. By contrast, if the
Canadian priority rules had applied, the purchasers would have taken
free of any such license unless—perhaps—the license was registered
or the purchasers had knowledge of it. Second, while the plan provided
that the purchasers were to take free and clear of any unknown license
other than a commercial license, it gave unknown licensees the
opportunity to identify themselves and to avoid extinguishment of
their claims. Licenses in this category might have included exclusive
licenses—these would certainly have been of the greatest concern to a
purchaser—and so, under Canadian law, they would have been
registrable, and a registered license probably has priority over the claim
of a subsequent transferee. In effect, the plan excused the holders of
registrable licenses for their failure to register by giving them a second
chance to publicize their claims.
The generosity of the Nortel plan brings into sharp relief the
inadequacy of current Canadian law in terms of protecting intellectual
property license holders both inside and outside insolvency
proceedings. BIA section 65.11(7) and CCAA section 32(6) protect the
licensee against extinguishment of its interest following disclaimer by
the licensor-debtor. As noted above, however, these reforms are
compromised to the extent that the licensor-debtor can sell the
underlying intellectual property interest free and clear of current
licenses. As it happens, the Nortel plan avoided this concern, but the
Nortel plan was substantially shaped by the requirements of United
States law, and there can be no guarantee that licensees will be as
generously provided for in future cases.
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V. POSSIBLE REFORMS
In the interests of economy, the following discussion focuses
mainly on patents.112 A partial response to the problem identified in
Part IV above, would be to amend CCAA, section 36 and the
corresponding provision in BIA, section 65.13 to make it clear that the
court may authorize a sale of assets, including patents and other
intellectual property, free and clear of third party claims, but only if the
laws that apply outside insolvency proceedings allow for free and clear
sales. This measure would bring the Canadian rules relating to asset
sales in insolvency proceedings more closely into line with the U.S.
position.
However, in the United States, the laws that apply outside
bankruptcy to the enforceability of a patent license against a transferee
of the intellectual property are well-established, and they favor the
licensee. By contrast, the corresponding Canadian laws are uncertain,
under-developed, and outdated. It follows that a comprehensive
solution to the issue in Nortel requires reform of not only the
insolvency laws, but the patent laws as well. Specifically, the patent
registration system should be expanded and modernized, and the
Patent Act itself should be amended to provide comprehensive and
coherent priority rules for competing claims. These new priority rules
would apply in insolvency proceedings in the same way they apply
outside insolvency, with the result that it would make no difference to
the parties’ relative entitlements whether the priority issue arises in the
context of insolvency proceedings or outside the insolvency system.113
A simpler and quicker response might be to amend BIA,
section 65.13 and CCAA, section 36 to make it clear that, while the
provisions extend to the sale of patents and other intellectual property,
the court may not authorize the sale of intellectual property free and
112
Somewhat different considerations may apply to other types of
intellectual property for which registration is not a requirement.
113
See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTITUTE OF CANADA, POSSIBLE
AMENDMENTS TO THE PATENT ACT AND PATENT RULES 13 (2013) (the Intellectual
Property Institute of Canada has recognized the need for reforms more or less along
these lines: “[c]larify interplay between registrations under the Patent Act/Personal
Property Security Act and bankruptcy proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Act/Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act.”).
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clear of current licenses.114 While a quick fix like this might be
tempting, given the challenges that would be involved in overhauling
the intellectual property laws, the temptation should be resisted.
Taking this approach would create a discrepancy between insolvency
law and the law that applies outside insolvency proceedings in the
treatment of intellectual property licenses. Specifically, the reforms
would put the intellectual property licensee in a stronger position,
relative to a transferee of the intellectual property, in the transferor’s
insolvency proceedings than it would be outside insolvency. As a
general rule, priority flips of this nature are inadvisable because they
encourage parties to use the insolvency laws opportunistically to
improve their priority position. Furthermore, the proposed reforms
would create a discrepancy between cases where the financially
troubled debtor’s asset sale takes place in insolvency proceedings and
cases where the asset sale is conducted outside the insolvency system.
In Nortel, the patent sale took place in the course of CCAA and
Chapter 11 proceedings. By contrast, Blackberry, another financially
troubled technology company, was until recently planning to sell its
patent portfolio without relying on the insolvency laws. Had the
Blackberry sale gone ahead, licensees’ interests would have been
governed by the non-bankruptcy priority rules described above. But
there is no principled reason why the parties’ entitlements, relative to
one another, should vary depending on whether the sale happens to
take place inside or outside insolvency proceedings.115

Or at least: (1) a prior registered license; (2) a prior unregistered
licensee of which the purchaser has knowledge; or (3) a license granted in the
ordinary course of the licensor’s business (for example, to an end-user).
115
The reforms proposed above may have conflict of laws implications,
for example, where a patent is registered in Jurisdiction A and the patent sale takes
place in Jurisdiction B. The conflict of laws issues are complex and require separate
study. See LEGISLATIVE REVIEW TASK FORCE (COMMERCIAL) OF THE INSOLVENCY
INSTITUTE OF CANADA AND THE CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF INSOLVENCY AND
RESTRUCTURING PROFESSIONALS, REPORT ON THE STATUTORY REVIEW OF THE
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT AND THE COMPANIES’ CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT 8 (2014) (identifying some of the issues). See also UNCITRAL,
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS: SUPPLEMENT ON SECURITY
RIGHTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Part X., U.N. Sales No. E.11.V.6 (2011).
114
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CONCLUSION
The Canadian insolvency laws, similar to the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code, limit an intellectual property owner’s freedom in insolvency
proceedings to disclaim licenses it has granted. The purpose of this
limitation is to protect the licensee’s reliance interest and to prevent
disruption of the licensee’s business. If the insolvency laws freely
allowed disclaimer of intellectual property licenses, they would increase
the up-front risk to prospective licensees and might have a chilling
effect on the licensing of intellectual property to the detriment of both
licensors and licensees.
Logically, this policy should also be reflected in the provisions
governing asset sales so that at least as a general rule, it should not be
possible for an intellectual property owner in insolvency proceedings
to sell the intellectual property free and clear of current licenses.
However, while this appears to be the law in the United States, the
position in Canada is much less certain. In principle, a Canadian
bankruptcy court should approach the issue with reference to the rules
which apply outside bankruptcy to priority disputes between
competing claims to intellectual property. But the applicable nonbankruptcy laws, as they currently stand, are fragmented, complex, and
unsettled. The laws are badly in need of reform.
It might be possible to amend the insolvency laws without also
reforming the intellectual property laws. However, this would be a
second-best solution. The problem is that it would make the licensee’s
position stronger or weaker, relative to a transferee of the intellectual
property, depending on whether the sale takes place inside or outside
insolvency proceedings. In other words, tackling the problem via the
insolvency laws, without reforming the intellectual property laws, may
result in arbitrary case outcomes and may induce debtors to favor asset
sales outside the insolvency system with a view to defeating licensees’
interests.
In any event, there is some urgency about the need for reform
because sales of intellectual property, and patent portfolios in
particular, are becoming increasingly common. The uncertain state of
the law threatens to reduce the returns from such sales because it
means parties must take expensive and time-consuming steps, as in
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Nortel, to clarify the purchaser’s title. It also threatens to reduce the
returns from the licensing of intellectual property because, as matters
presently stand, a prospective licensee cannot be sure that its license
will still be valid if the underlying intellectual property is subsequently
transferred.116
In today’s economy almost every business depends on licensed
intellectual property rights to a greater or lesser extent, and
consequently every business is potentially exposed to the threat of
“hold-up” by patent assertion entities which have acquired intellectual
property rights from a licensor in financial distress. This is not a remote
or theoretical problem; it is happening regularly around the world.
There is no question that the problem will come to Canada, if it has
not already. The only question is whether we will be ready when it does
arrive.

116
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
LESSONS FROM INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (2013) (see
Chapter 5 dealing with transfers of patents with licensing commitments, and
especially Chapter 5.2 discussing recent cases from around the world, including
Nortel).
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